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Dreaming-machine
Diurnal Insomnia in Digital Wonderland
Marek Wojtaszek
 
   Introduction
1 There is a cultural tradition, both cinematic, literary and scholarly1, of likening digital
communication to dreams,  of  correlating them and positing them in various causal
constellations. On a more general level, the digital constitutes an expression of a long-
lasting  human  dream  (come  true)  of  tethering  —  via  technology  —  all  spheres  of
existence  (Hayles  1999)  whereas  our  capacity  to  dream,  as  well  as  a  cultural
understanding  of  the  role  of  dreaming  undergo  a  deep  transformation  due  to
digitization.  As Sherry Turkle observes,  “The computer takes us  beyond a world of
dreams […] because it  enables us to contemplate mental  life  that exists  apart  from
bodies.  It  enables us to contemplate dreams” (Turkle 1995: 22),  equally indicating a
machine-led  dissociation  of  dreams  from  the  human.  The  ubiquity  of  sensors  and
sentient apparatuses, the Internet of Things and Places, together with computational
networks, engender an immanent code-space (Kitchin & Dodge 2011) which makes the
dream bypass both sleep and daydreaming, and assume the form of a body-snatching2
simulacrum.  Historically  motivated  and  conceptually  amalgamated  by  a  dream  of
perfect control and protection in the Cold War era, and a countercultural dream of
living without constraints (Turner 2006), the digital has evolved as a technology of the
paradox  by  attempting  to  creatively  reconcile  the  two  inherent  opposites  of
determinacy and liberty. Affirming and exploring the culturally ambiguous status of
the digital — its discreet position in between the concrete (the real) and the abstract
(the virtual) — this essay recasts digital cultural production as a “dreaming-machine,”
all the while disentangling the meaning of dream. Positing computation in terms of a
cultural symptom, and offering a critical-creative account of dreams in digital culture,
this  essay  will  unravel  some  of  the  negative  ramifications  of  the  liaisons  between
dream and digital code, and point towards their alternative aesthetic configuration.
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I. Between Dream and the Digital
2 To make my argument more transparent, we must first clarify the concept of “dreams”
given the semantic wealth and the cultural being of the term. Etymologically, the term
stems from old Norse (“draumr”)3 and Proto-Germanic (“draugmaz”),4 two languages in
which  the  term broadly  denoted  phantasm,  illusion,  or  deception.  Additionally,  its
Western meaning is strengthened by the Platonic theory of images where it designates
imperfect — sensible, changing and epistemically untrustworthy — copies of the ideas,
and  yet  ones  which  are  generative  of  mirth,  rejoicing  and  merriment,  which  the
dream’s old Anglo-Saxon provenance (“drōm”)5 articulated later on in terms of music
playing.6 Importantly,  in  contemporary  culture  —  significantly  shaped  by
psychoanalysis  (Freud  2010)7 —  “dream”  designates  a  sleeping  vision,  meaning  “to
somniate” in the first instance (OED). The popular sense of dream as an aspiration, ideal
or wish dates back to the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries (OED), and paradoxically
implies that ideals can come to life only in dreams. Consequently, “dreams” will retain
their  proximate relation to  reality  — whether  in  sleep by unconsciously  re-playing
remembered  experiences,  or  by  inspiring  our  conscious  choices  and  actions.  This
similarity of dream and reality is exactly what distinguishes it from fantasy that, in
essence,  imaginatively  expresses  a  digression  or  flight  from  reality,  helping  us  to
experience the (im)possible in a more approachable and delicate manner; only dreams
(can) come true. Furthermore, these two elementary designations, i.e. sleeping dreams
and waking dreams (whether in the form of ideals, wishes or daydreams), emerge out of
a  primordial  structure  dichotomously  governing  our  experience  of  fatigue  (i.e.
oscitancy, somnolence) and repose (i.e. daydreaming).
3 Digital culture appears to skillfully conjoin and play with these two meanings of dream,
constituting  both  a  mirthful  dream-coming  true  of  “silicon”  technocrats  and  an
inexhaustible mine of dreamlike visions of digital  future,8 all  the while spitting out
various  examples  of  digital  intoxication,  ecstasy,  anxiety,  addiction  and  alienation,
having us commonly perceive the virtual as a sleepless, oneiric Wonderland unfolding
in front of our eyes, and gradually immersing us sensibly in its synthetic environment.
4 My contention,  therefore,  which  may appear  counterintuitive  at  first  sight,  is  that
digital code and its rhizomatic cultural production are expressive of what dreaming
bodies can do, that is, the ontological labor of sleepless dream, and as such, a diurnal,
rather  than  nocturnal,  practice  of  insomnia,  a  wakeful  existence  that  neither
anaesthetizes  the senses nor fears  the worst  of  nightmares.  Rather than drawing a
utopian  or  somnambular,  post-media  vision  of  digital  civilizational  growth,  my
proposition of the dreaming-machine — complexifying our conventional image of the
medium — nuances  the  convergences  and corruptions  that  intercede  and interlace
dream and computation. Consequently, the digital will be immanently reconfigured as
a production of entanglement between dreams of machine and machines of dream. This
necessitates  reconceiving  the  notion  of  dream,  which  —  after  Gilles  Deleuze  —  I
postulate  in  terms of  diurnal  insomnia.  Dispensing  with  the  negative  image  of  the
digital as narcotic and deceptive, I will recast it as exhaustive, emphasizing its inceptive
aspect.  In order to illustrate my theoretical discussion, I  revert to the film under a
telling  title,  Inception,  which  is  read  aesthetically  as  an  adequate  rendition  of  the
insomniac revolution in dreaming.
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5 The 2010 film by director Christopher Nolan offers a curious meditation on the world of
dreams. Inception tells the story of a group of thieves who specialize in extracting secret
thoughts from the subconscious while the person is dreaming by employing a “dream
within a dream” technique. On the whole, this is a story about people sharing a dream,
which  necessitates  limitlessness  in  the  selection  and  employment  of  means  of
expression  (Taubin  2010:  32).  Aesthetically  and  narratively  blending  the  genres  of
action,  heist,  mind-game  (Elsaesser  2009),  thriller,  science-fiction,  crime,  mystery,
adventure  and film noir,  the  movie  does  justice  to  the  actual  economy of  dreams.
Questioning  the  nature  of  dreams,  Inception attempts  to  develop  a  pedagogy  of
dreaming, which I consider to be a timely and adequate rejoinder and alternative to the
contemporary digital-cultural usurpations and abuses of dreams. The film explores the
human  capacity  for  insomniac  dreaming,  which  —  far  from  being  a  mindless,
technologically induced, reaction to exponential growth of the digital realm — emerges
as a vigilant response to its totalizing and militaristic Zen of algorithmically enhanced
existence, successfully avoiding the traps of digital dialectics. I side with Deleuze, who
claims, 
It is not at all the case that the revolutions are determined by technical progress
[…]  The  technocrat  is  the  natural  friend  of  the  dictator  —  computers  and
dictatorship;  but  the  revolutionary  lives  in  the  gap  which  separates  technical
progress  from  social  totality,  and  inscribes  there  his  dream  of  permanent
revolution.  This dream  is  itself  action,  reality,  and  an  effective  menace  to  all
established order: it renders possible what it dreams about. (Deleuze 2004b:59) 
6 Following Deleuze’s appeal to read cultural and cinematic production not in terms of its
textuality, ideological value, or even its historicity, but rather vitality,9 I  investigate
what potential extra-textual use(s) the film can have — specifically how it radicalizes
and sharpens our understanding of the digital, of dreams and the concatenation of the
two. Viewed immanently, away from the specular economy of representation, the film
will be read as “a mind/body/machine meld, as experience” (Kennedy 2000: 5), which
— in keeping with Daniel Frampton’s postulation about film being not about narrating
or showing anything (Frampton 2006: 7) — involves an analysis of how Inception thinks
dreams and how this  relates to digital  cultural  production.10 In what follows,  I  will
elucidate some of the cultural entanglements of the dream and the digital, explicating
the  immanent  dream  work  that  is  expressive  of  contemporary  digital  culture.
Consequently, the essay argues for a co-involution of humans and digital machines, thus
eschewing a  dichotomy of  either  a  technophobic  tirade  of  the  digital  alienation of
humanity or a celebration of messianic computation.
 
II. Dreams in Digital Wonderland
7 Digital  technology  determines  nearly  all  aspects  of  existence  in  Western  societies.
Digital code, paired with computational networks, has succeeded in mesmerizing and
beguiling Western mentality, which — as I will argue — is due to their technological
aptitude  to  s(t)imulate  dream  work.  Innumerable  techno-digital  innovations  have
provoked a vertiginous and dizzying cultural effect, unprecedented in its speed and
scope  —  far  removed  from  the  classic  worldview  shaped  by  dominant  dualistic
metaphysics, thus no longer possible to capture in its purely rational categories. This is
manifest  in  the  industrial  automation  of  reality  and  the  hyper-animation  of  the
sensorium, thus triggering a proliferation of fantastic imageries and fuzzy experiences.
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Equipped with sensors of advanced body-infiltrating power and endowed with powerful
data-crunching, AI and profiling capacities, computational media mine our senses and
design  experience  for  us  through  customization  and  social  anticipation.  It  is  the
essentially pre-cognitive and automatic nature of this operation, whereby machines are
capable of extracting sensible data otherwise inaccessible to our understanding, and of
programming and projecting a context for experiencing,11 that legitimizes a parallel
between the digital and dream as involuntarily sensed. Paradoxically, data-saturated
environments emerge as characteristic of, simultaneously, an increased psychological
alertness, social mobilization as well as intensified desire for digital solutionism, and an
omnipresent atmosphere of psychosomatic apathy, emotional dispassion and ethical
indifference, which partakes of mind-body split. The latter symptoms can justifiably be
diagnosed as an effect of the former. Traditional readings of Inception reveal that bodies
have  to  be  immobilized  and  restful  (asleep)  so  that  the  mind  can  perform  highly
complicated problem-solving operations. Furthermore, the sense of general fatigue can
also be legitimately attributed to the digital formalization of dreaming, which in turn
results in a vertigo of technological invention and innovation.12 
8 Fueled by digital apparatuses, acceleration has been the constant leitmotiv of cultural
modernity,  leading  to  a  technological  demotion  of  forms  of  mediation  regarded as
hampering  progress.  Stressing  the  time  needed  for  successful  extraction,  Inception
documents  that  even  the  instant  takes  too  long,  eliminating  the  experience  of
gratification, which takes time to be actually sensed and lived, and suspending it in a
limbo  of  anticipation  and  satisfaction  which  is  forever  provisional.  This  peculiar
dreamlike ambiance of timelessness creates an ambiguous sensation of there (both in
reality and in dream) being plenty of time (an impression generated in a dream) and no
time at all (time increases exponentially as you move deeper through dream levels).
Dominic  Cobb says,  “When you dream,  your  mind functions  more  quickly,  so  time
seems to pass more slowly”. Apparently asleep or apathetic at one level, the characters
are wide awake and hyperactive at another. Since the film commences and concludes
with dream scenes  and the majority  of  the narrative  is  a  dream,  experienced by a
sleeping Cobb on the airplane, it is impossible to adjudicate where and when the real
might be, providing a standardized ground for measuring velocity of the time flow,
thus creating a sensation of timeless presence. Rather than hailing the digital as a great
facilitator and accelerator, or accusing it of cultural imperialism and impoverishment,
the  digital,  as  Inception  instructs,  can be  (re)conceived immanently  to  s(t)imulate  a
dream of insomnia, thus helping us reinvent ourselves as diurnal insomniacs.
9 Eliminating anticipation and virtualizing the past, the digital regime of the (eternal)
present is analogous to dream work, where imagery immediately expresses desire with
no  formal  mediation,  which  —  coupled  with  a  capitalistic  drive  to  dismantle  all
intermediaries, consequently accelerating the communication process — emerges as a
symptom of cultural infantilism. Recalling Huizinga’s diagnosis of puerilism (Huizinga
1936: 170-82) the figure of a sentimentalized child embodies the utopia of solipsistic
bliss  in  digital  culture  —  innocuous,  instinctual,  authentic  in  its  expressions,
spontaneous, playful, yet also demanding, defiant, insatiable, and narcissistic. One can
note, on the one hand, a moral inversion, as we regard serious matters of life as a game
whilst play is treated with deadly seriousness, and on the other, a capitalist-induced
psychological  need  of  provisional  satisfaction,  whereby  no  object  of  digitally
s(t)imulated desire is ever complete and ready to exhaust all our needs, since another
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Beta version is always about to be released (Hammersley 2012: 391-4). Like children, we
are trained to learn how to become comfortable with the tentative, experiencing our
satisfaction as increasingly ephemeral and dreamlike. Again, the digital serves here as a
palliative,  offering  instant  algorithmic  contraceptives  that  secure  us  from
impregnating our existence with the tragedy of endless approximation (of the ideal).
Akin to dreaming, by distracting and dispersing our creative vital energies away from
sacrificial attachment to a linearized pursuit of the culturally pre-established ideals,
the  digital  facilitates  our  departure  from  forever  belated  representation  and
rediscovery and animation of the simulacrum. Virtualizing our existence, the digital
helps  us  dream  ourselves  computationally  out  of  our  cultural  limitations  and  in  a
childlike manner (re)create fancifully an immediate Wonderland, thus — as Inception 
posits — producing a dream more real than (the) real. 
10 The  prevailing  soporific  atmosphere  of  contemporary  digital  culture  has  also  been
discretely determined by the shared sensation of weightlessness and incessancy of the
code.  Both  digital  code  and  dreams  appear  to  share  the  same  mechanism  of
actualization — whether through the intermediary of sensory interface in the case of
the former, or retrievable memory in the case of the latter. Paradoxically, this is also
what differentiates  them — dreams being singular,  elusive,  unbridled and,  content-
wise,  impossible  to  repeat  as  opposed  to  the  code  that  is  iterative,  transparent,
controlled, and operating complex algorithms born of collective visions. Regardless of
ontological  distinctions,  they  both  function  in  the  social  imaginary  as  surficial
(con)figurations, characterized by depthlessness and lightness, which is also related to
their  complex  nature.  One  can  legitimately  say  that  they  are  experienced
rhapsodically13 rather than textually as a clear image, i.e. as vibration or resonance. 14
Digital  culture  crystallizes  a  world  that  may  be  artificial,  but  is  not  counterfeit;
conversely, the digital world’s (perhaps) initially fraudulent and fabricated dreamlike
image has always been real, as evidenced by social media. The siren songs of digital
technology have lured and lulled us into a world where one can no longer tell  the
difference between reality and dreaming.
 
III. (Digital) Inception of Diurnal Insomnia
11 This simulative environment reminds us of Alice’s adventures in Through the Looking-
Glass, a sequel to Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland. When she encounters the Red King
asleep in the grass, Tweedledum and Tweedledee tell her he is dreaming about her, and
that if he were to wake up, she would “go out — bang! — just like a candle!” (Carroll
2012:  157).  This  story  seems relevant  to  the  actual  process  of  cultural  digitization,
whereby computational machines are already dreaming a dream of/for humanity. They
intensify the conjunction of the digital and dreams, thus stimulating their aesthetic
entanglements.  Under  such  circumstances,  we  need  to  develop  an  alternative
conceptual framework that, instead of commenting on the reality as it has been and
deconstructing the entrenched dualistic opposites,  allows us to assess what broader
cultural use the dream/digital complex may have in a wider context. Put differently, it
is unlikely to answer the question whether one is dreaming or not. “Groups that are too
interested in dreams, like psychoanalysts or surrealists, are also quick to form tribunals
that judge and punish in reality: a disgusting mania frequent in dreamers” (Deleuze
1998:  129-130).  By  technologically  projecting  the  virtual  realm and encouraging  its
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exploration,  digital  apparatuses  facilitate  our  rediscovery  of  dreams  as  a  proper
expression of our own, original, virtual and vital constitution. This consequently fuels
reconsideration of our capacity to dream afar from the dualistic and moral frameworks
forever downgrading dream’s simulacral and s(t)imulative significance in human life.
 
Dream of Extraction
12 This is an especially burning question now when digital media are instituting a novel —
dream-driven — communication paradigm. With the digital inception of the virtual,
humans have had to learn anew how to navigate within and differentiate between two
parallel  spheres  of  existence.  Gaining  the  aptitude  to  pre-cognitively  access  and
extract sensible data, digital apparatuses are capable of s(t)imulating sensations and
perceptions, and using them to design and implement synthetic (future) realities for us
to  inhabit.  Many  thinkers  have  warned  us  of  this  groundbreaking  technological
achievement, which has materialized Heidegger’s proposition of Gestell as inherent in
technè, and explored its potential and actual implications for humanity.15 Clearly, the
digital  went  beyond  what  had  been  socially  considered  technology’s  purpose  —
catering to the strictly biological or natural needs of human beings.16 Breaking with the
dominant psychological-functionalist  mantra of  ‘technology begins with a need and
ends with a solution’, the digital proves to be a medium — and not solely a means — of
experience,  substantially  contributing  to  the  creation  of  the  world.  Essentially
governed  by  a  will-to-transformation,  digital  technology  reveals  what  is,  offers  an
“enframing”  of  possible  experience  (Heidegger  1977:  20).17 Discontented  with  its
determining role in culture, digital technology has become “the System” (Ellul 2004:
13). Enveloping bodies with electromagnetic networks and insinuating themselves into
the  senses,  digital  technologies  have  effectively  connected  us  to  the  system  of
aggregated servers, submitting us to their computational operations. In doing so, they
have bypassed our consciousness and begun to systematically survey our existence and
design experience for us by digitally “reengineering presence” (Thrift 2008: 95). The
systemic character of this operation and its extensive cultural ramifications prompted
Éric Sadin (2011) to diagnose a radical shift in social development, whereby we witness
emergence  of  a  novel  “society  of  anticipation.”  Abandoning  faith  in  tradition  as
incapable  of  providing  us  with  a  reliable  guide  to  a  sustainable  future  existence,
Western societies trust the analytic and predictive powers of digital apparatuses. They
are  hopeful  that  their  simulative  and  computational capacities  —  having  already
exceeded  human  comprehension  (!)  —  will  fruitfully  generate  adequate  responses,
forecasting optimal solutions and programming livable futures. Essentially supportive
of  the  predictive  faculty  of  machines,  dedicated  algorithms  are  specifically  geared
towards extracting (i.e. stealing in Inception) and profiling sensible data. Delegating the
power of creation to algorithmic media leaves us no choice but to anticipate and have
confidence in the script they compute and customize for us, synthetizing an alternative
reality.  Crucially,  the  digital  dream  of  the  future  actualizes  itself  in  the  present,
programmatically  determining  and  channeling  our  potential  becoming.  Since  our
consciousness  is  not  able  to  grasp  a  future  that  has  not  yet  been  lived,  it  is  now
culturally trained to anticipate its computational diegesis and algorithmic synthesis,
which again coincides with the capitalistic reformatting of pleasure and education in
how to derive enjoyment from the provisional. This cautions us that we ought not to
trust dreams as they are an automatic process and can, therefore, be easily coopted by
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digital capitalism targeting the future anterior of (digitally-inflected) existence. After
all, dreams are filled with either daytime’s residues or constitute a sterile reiteration of
things  past.  As  early  as  the  1920s,  D. H.  Lawrence  —  criticizing  psychoanalysis’
schematic and naïve view of dreams — warned us about dreams by saying, “We have to
be wary of giving way to dreams […] That which is lovely to the automatic process is
hateful to the spontaneous soul” (Lawrence 1923: 169-170). Nowadays, our experience
turns out to be a coming-true of a future dream digitally incepted in the present whose
accomplishment will  forever have to be preempted by yet another one:  we exist  in
endless  anticipation.  This  can  be  illustrated  by  a  range  of  contemporary  cultural
practices, starting with the capitalistic monitoring of customers to provide customized
products and ensure narcissism-fueled subscription, through app-based and algorithm-
controlled  dietary  and  self-care  rituals,  and  ending  with  statutory  surveillance  of
populations to enforce order,  quantify and qualify citizens,18 or the forecasting and
programming  of  social  policies  and  budgetary  plans.  This  results  in  replacing  the
classical  communication  paradigm  of  feedback  with  a  prior  feed-forward,  which
consists in digital (and precognitive) extracting of sensible data from us and the world
that — having undergone algorithmic computation — will virtually have returned to us,
molding  our  near-future  actualizations.  Feedback  will  by  necessity  come later  as  a
mode of communication with an always already (pre)constituted presence, whilst feed-
forward enables technical communication with digital dreams through an intermediary
of  sensible  interface,  which  altogether  makes  it  impossible  for  us  to  differentiate
anymore between the reality of dream and the dream of reality — the two becoming
one dreaming reality, a dreaming-machine.
13 Inception puts  forth  an  immanent  political  economy  of  dreaming,  prioritizing  the
architectural question — whose dream are we in? Further to this, it reminds us that
dreams  are  a  risky  business,  and  they  will  always  dialectically  attract  the  non-
dreamers’ profit-oriented attention. Deleuze cautions us: 
People’s dreams are always all-consuming and threaten to devour us. What other
people dream is very dangerous. Dreams are a terrifying will-to-power. Each of us is
the victim of other people’s dreams […] Beware of the dreams of others, because if
you are caught in their dreams, you are done for.19 (Deleuze 2006: 318)
14 Consequently,  the society of dreamers emerges as a society of prisoners,  affectively
enslaved  and  subservient  to  others’  desires.  In  sleeplessly  creating  mazes  —
labyrinthine  architectures  far  more  complex  than  reality  as  we  know  it,  far  more
secretive and alien — Inception demonstrates that we stand a chance of outsmarting the
vicious  dream of  the  (digital  and capitalist)  Other.  Digital  code is  always  already a
metaphysical  Other,  that  is  our  perfect  dream,  our  cultural  dream-come-true  of
perfection: it  thus belongs to us,  expressing in fact sameness rather than authentic
difference. Therefore, mindful detachment from this logical framework, attained via in-
somniac dreaming, necessarily has to proceed immanently — as the film advocates —
by involving an inception of a far more radical dream born from within our visceral
sensibility.  Only  digital  intoxication  generates  either  convulsive  or  compulsive
symptoms, or sheer numbness. The digital per se is not an impoverishment of existence;
it partakes of the human condition, thus immanently facilitating its revival and our
cultural  transformation.20 An  affirmative,  aesthetic,  reconceptualization  of  digital
culture is especially crucial today when, as Inception brutally pictures, both technology
and dreams turn into spaces of conflict and corruption where corporate interests or
intersubjective  dramas  are  played  out  in  a  banal  fashion,  or  into  spaces  of
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militarization,  narcissistic  conformism  and  heathenish  tribalism.  Disavowing  the
dialectic of dreams (the virtual) and reality, an insomniac dream — unlike any other
dream  that  places  temporal  limits  on  all  our  waking  projects  and  conscious
involvements — welcomes (self-)extraction as a precondition of blissful oblivion and
inception of a novel idea,  of  an existence unstained and unhaunted by the (digital)
Other’s dream. The last image from the movie of a spinning top rotating on a table —
which is Cobb’s method of distinguishing between dream (it spins without falling) and
reality (it falls) — could leave us in doubt as to the space he inhabits then. However, the
fact that Cobb is not looking at it clearly expresses his disinterest in this dialectic. The
scene does not purport to warn us about self-delusion in order to stay happy, nor even
about not knowing whether one is lying to oneself or not — both options convey moral
judgment. The spinning totem affirms the multiplicity of the idea, its inceptive, i.e.
incessant  and  innumerable,  actualizations  —  the  virtual origin  to  which  Cobb’s
insomniac dream reconnects him.
 
Diurnal Insomnia
15 Rather  than  being  an  attempt  to  accomplish  the  impossible  by  negating  the
representational  construction of  dreams and denying their  inceptive nature,  digital
culture is intent on exhausting the possible by both simulacrally extending the dream
up to a point of non-distinguishability between reality and dream, and reducing it to a
minimum, which creates a paradoxical condition of diurnal insomnia. “This dreamless
sleep in which one nonetheless does not fall  asleep, this insomnia that nonetheless
sweeps  the  dream along  as  far  as  the  insomnia  extends  — […]  such  is  the  way  of
escaping judgment” (Deleuze 2006: 130). Diurnal insomnia cannot be formally conflated
with, and imaginatively compared to, either the (sterility of) dream or the (intoxicated)
consciousness,  which  pale  beside  its  dreamful  exuberance.  Dreaming  is  no  longer
opposed to insomnia, the latter becoming its virtual driving force. Put differently, by
playing (with) dreams, the digital gives culture an incentive to reinvent itself as an
insomniac dreaming-machine, that has made of dreaming “a guardian of insomnia that
keeps it from falling asleep” (Deleuze 2006: 130). Insomniac dreaming retains ghostly
agency  both  in  its  passive  synthesis21 and  commitment  to  resist  the  soporific  or
intoxicating allurements of established values and habits that dull awareness, and thus
is characterized by vigilance — a watchful condition that replaces epistemic criticism.22
I  dream and in dreaming I  affirm more than I  know: dreaming is  not so much the
condition  of  possible  knowledge  but  the  location  where  I  can  virtualize knowledge.
Diurnal insomnia is tantamount to a power to dream expressed as the reality’s power to
simulate.  Far  removed  from  the  fallacy  of  a  “thing”  with  a  “location,”  dreaming
designates  a  mirthful  and  dynamic  —  discreet  —  process  of  incepting,  which
immanently exposes us to the forces of creation. Grasping this paradoxical position of
dream in The Difficulty of Being, Jean Cocteau writes,
What  is  certain  is  that  this  enfolding,  through  the  medium  of  which  eternity
becomes  livable  to  us  is  not  produced  in  dreams  in  the  same  way  as  in  life.
Something of the fold unfolds. Thanks to this our limits change, widen. The past,
the future no longer exist; the dead rise again, places construct themselves without
architects, without journeys […] Moreover, the atmospheric and profound triviality
of the dream favors encounters, surprises, acquaintanceships, a naturalness which
our enfolded world ([…] projected onto the surface of the fold) can only ascribe to
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the supernatural […] I say natural, because one of the characteristics of the dream is
that nothing in it astonishes us. (Cocteau 1967: 57) 
16 Dreams no longer oppose reality; the dream of insomnia expresses a profound dream of
and into reality, a becoming-dream of reality; that is its immanent creation — a dream
within a dream, a vertiginous state of intoxication that our waking life has to learn how
to fold so that we can sustainably endure the world’s dream of eternity by mindfully
reducing and organizing its unlivable speed.
17 Doing justice to Jack Kerouac’s observation that “everybody in the world dreams every
night  ties  all  humanity  together”  (Kerouac  2001:  xv),  Inception configures  sleepless
dreams as a unique material interface, a solitary laboratory of the senses, a discreet
activity that can bring us together (again) within and without the digital system. Far
from a grandiose and apocalyptic, dialectically-fueled, vision of what the future may be
like when machines rise against their progenitors and reduce them to total subjection,
the film develops a discreet image of the virtual, successfully bypassing the polarity of
utopian and dystopian scenarios. The postmodern philosophical operation of removing
foundations  serves  here  as  a  basic  leitmotif  —  extirpation  of  established  truths  is
joyously welcomed and inspires a thorough transmutation of both waking and dream
reality. Interestingly, the loss of metaphysical qualities has historically coincided with
the era of technological triumph, which altogether strengthened the cultural potential
for  liberation,  enabling social  dis-alienation.  Crucially,  technology alone is  far  from
emancipatory. Inception’s message is clear — neither does modern technology herald a
revolution as such, nor is revolution an appropriate answer to technological will-to-
power.  Emancipation from entrenched dualistic  metaphysics  in  the movie  does  not
proceed by force or dialectical combat; it involves an act of dreaming. Inception delivers
an  instructive  seminar  on  the  mechanics  of  insomniac  dreaming  that  begins  by
enlisting its two characteristics. Firstly, dreaming, as an act, “has to be made” (Deleuze
1998:192)  and  in  the  making,  it  makes  our  existence  insular  and  unreproducible.
Secondly, given that a dream is like no other, inherently different in terms of length,
intensity, and content, each one heralds a new start — an inception. “Dreaming […] is
dreaming of pulling away, of being already separate, far from any continent, of being
lost and alone — it is dreaming of starting from scratch, recreating, beginning anew”
(Deleuze 2004a: 10). The constitution of the dream of insomnia, however, is far from
Platonic. Deleuze continues, “To dream is to gain access to this world where nothing
resembles anything else; a pure dreamer would never leave the particular, he would
grasp only differences” (Deleuze 2004a: 45) The film makes it exceptionally clear that to
think of dreams as mere appearances, free-floating images without logical association,
motivated  by  real  experiences  and  loosely  readapted  during  sleep  is  to  utterly
disregard  their  s(t)imulative  inceptive  nature.  As  such,  dreams  have  easily  been
appropriated by digital machines that subsume them under the virtual, which turns
dreams into screens upon which messy and infantile images of an especially primitive
imagination are projected, thus downgrading their aesthetic and cognitive potential.
Nonetheless,  digital  technologies  have  reawakened  our  capacity  to  somniate  by
depathologizing23 dreams  and  framing  them  as  a  pragmatic  tool  for  enriching  our
existence. Consequently, as the film shows, it will not suffice to debunk the (digital)
dream of reality as it will forever unfold yet another somnolent layer. One needs to tire
oneself of this incessant pursuit of dreaming; one needs to feel the heaviness of the labor
of the dream one is tied to actively and passively, and reach the level of exhaustion —
insomnia,  that  constitutes  a  prerequisite  of  a  mindful  dream of  new sensibility.  In-
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ception (of an idea, i.e. of change) necessitates in-somnia — simultaneously in-voluntary
and in-voluted dreaming, a dream within a dream, as the main protagonist, Dominic
Cobb who is incapable of sleeping, emphasizes, “Downwards is the only way forwards.” 
 
Original Exhaustion
18 Exposing the limits of modern skepticism by means of dreams, Inception digs deeper
into its legacy in order to radically question the (subjective and objective) ground of
the understanding of our experience, suggesting that it may be virtually elsewhere. In
doing so, it therefore explicitly tackles the problem of origin.24 This time Cobb and his
team are tasked with the more difficult job of implanting — “incepting” — an idea into
the mind without it being aware of it. Pirating or extracting a secret, as the present
level of digital advancement proves, is no longer a real challenge and, curiously, it is
socially perceived as not an insurmountable issue. With the industry of sensible data
mining and synthetic engineering of pre-cognitive fate, and digitally s(t)imulated social
narcissism  legitimating  exhibitionistic  proclivities,  digital  culture  promotes
unencumbered publicity, condoning the capitalist exploitation of secrecy and favoring
the ultimate renunciation of privacy (Lanier 2014). Inception, however, breaks (out of)
such a social regime and requires a different strategy from either theft or willful or
apathetic  surrender.  Dreaming  provides  an  architecture  for  implantation,  which
highlights its germinal nature — of both receptivity and fecundity. By virtue of their
automatic nature, dreams are chosen as the perfect portal to ingress into an act of
thinking. In order to produce (i.e. implant) this incept (i.e. idea), the thieves first have
to enter — break into — the dream within their target’s dreams. Implemented from the
outside, thought is represented as a violent act. It originates by abolishing the reality
from which it has violently emerged and to which it lays claim, hence its criminal and
properly  inceptive  nature.  The  film makes  conspicuously  little  use  of  digital
apparatuses,  suggesting virtuality  is  embedded in  humanity  for  humans are  always
materially immersed in the world’s technologies, unlimited to the digital doubling of
reality achieved by communication media. Inception immanently exhausts the origins of
thought in the imaginative terrain of dreams, demonstrating that the idea expresses an
insomniac dream, a dream exhausting the virtual potential of dream reality. Prior to its
inception in the mind of another person, the idea itself must be produced. There is no
original starting point (which is a virtual dream of representation); rather an infinite
vortex  of  multiple  forces,  a  dream  of  exhausting  potentialities,  a  discreet  middle
ground, the idea itself — the virtual. A pure concept does not suffice; the incept calls for
a greater imaginative elaboration — it brings together percept, affect and concept. As
such, it can be interwoven into a dream with its own internal physical architecture and
symbolic design. The procedure of inception demands that the mind be put to sleep,
which appears misleading only if we dialectically oppose the dreaming reality of sleep
to the conscious reality of the mind. When we dream, we do not realize that we are
dreaming, forgetting25 that the dream is our only reality and the mind is an image — an
idea immanently ‘incepted’ into its course. “It is a dream of the mind that has to be
made,  fabricated” (Deleuze 1998:  172).  As  such,  the dream is  charged with a crime
against the constituted (dualistic) order of reality, but — more importantly — the mind
is a criminal act itself. The tagline of the film announces, “The dream is real and your
mind is the scene of crime”, echoing Hélène Cixous’s observation about the criminal
power of dreaming, 
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We should write as we dream […] it’s healthy, because it’s the only place where we
never lie […] Now if we think that our whole lives are built on lying — they are
strange buildings — we should try and write as our dreams teach us; shamelessly,
fearlessly,  and  by  facing  what  is  inside  every  human  being  —  sheer  violence,
disgust, terror, shit,  invention, poetry. Our dreams are the greater poets. In our
dreams we are criminals; we kill, and we kill with a lot of enjoyment. But we are
also the happiest people on earth; we all make love as we never make love in life. So
at least let’s not forget that we have secret authors hidden in our unconscious […]
(Cixous 1990: 22). 26
19 Inception pictures  the  machine-based  process  of  the  immanent  making  of  the
unconscious,  inviting  us  to  face  the  formidable  ontological  velocity  and  aesthetic
complexity of the virtual. It is logical to infer that the act of (sleepless) dream must be
contingent on exhaustion and thus requires courage and singular accountability to/for
one’s own becoming (of oneself) through virtual creation of a meshwork of sustainable
relations. When we are exhausted, we are on the wrong path, doing something that (we
sense) contradicts our nature, diminishing our joy of existence. But exhaustion — as
opposed to (fatality and finality of) fatigue — equally remains originally open-ended,
pointing towards the infinite. Inception emerges as a treatise on the art of exhaustion —
on  how  the  possible  (of  dreaming  and  of  reality)  gets  exhausted  in  the  dream  of
insomnia;  and  that  act  of  violence  perpetrated  on  the  possible  leaves  us  physio-
logically debilitated to the point of total renunciation and disinterestedness — the art
of  detachment,  par  excellence.  Exhaustion  is  the  condition  of  detachment  from  the
possible and virtual creation of the real.
20 Given  the  inceptive  nature  of  digital  technologies,  we  can  wonder  whether  our
exhaustion has us surrender to the digital (dream). Or is it the dream of the digital that
exhausts us? Or again, could it be the digital (dream) that exhausts itself? Either way, it
is exhaustion that abolishes any sense of reality. From this vantage point, the digital can
well be viewed as an art of exhaustion; it exhausts reality as we know it. It stands for a
human-machine effort  of  extraction/exhaustion of  the  culturally  possible,  which —
aside  from weariness,  mindless  addiction and narcissistic  convulsion — proliferates
affirmative ideas and architectures of existence. Expressing a different, techno-logical,
point  of  departure  for  cultural  growth  from  that  of  the  traditional  Western
metaphysics, the digital immanently infiltrates and inflects the real as we have known
it, thus simultaneously exhausting and augmenting it. Through dizzying, Escher-like,
topological mazes, Inception aesthetically exposes us to, and expresses an ontology of,




21 Even though Inception does not explicitly address digital code, the film aptly grasps the
“dream predicament” that characterizes contemporary digital culture. Making use of
the mechanical and automatic functions — that have dominated established discourses
on dreams, relegating them to the nocturnal sphere of the mind’s sleep — the movie
sets off on a far more revolutionary journey into sleepless dream. The dream is not
deceptive  but  virtually  inceptive.27 Through  the  dream  of  insomnia,  the  film
rediscovers a vertiginous virtual field of forces that no longer differentiate between
technology  and  sensibility,  but  discreetly  entangle  them,  albeit  oftentimes
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imperceptibly. Back in 2010, the year of Inception’s release, what could have appeared as
a  fuzzy  dream  or  a  far-fetched  prophecy  has  become  our  reality:  digital  code  via
sensory  interfaces  wrings  sensible  data  from  us  and  the  world,  thus  virally
materializing  itself  and algorithmically  enfolding  our  existence.  The  film,  however,
does more than just project a possible digital future. It exhausts the possible of the
digital (dream) to reach its virtual origin in the present, thus offering a vigilant theory
of its cultural, inceptive, being. In dreaming — as Inception illuminates — we are diurnal
insomniacs, mobilizing and virtualizing the past in the present.
22 By  exhausting  the  automatic  tension  of  the  dream,  we  incept  the  digital,  thus
anaesthetizing its narcotic power. In the current dream of capitalistic perpetual growth
through technological  enhancement,  the  digital  —  fostered  by  the  beta-desire  of
corporate mediocrity — has served global optimization; its virtual potential remains
thus  yet  to  be  maximized  and  exhausted.  Our  “dream  predicament”  under  digital
capitalism  —  marked  by  virulent  automatism,  soporific  repetition,  and  hedonistic
fetishism — emerges as the cultural symptom of a wider digital fatigue, producing only
tarnished  dreams.  Technologically  determined  solitariness  —  as  in  a  classic  dream
formula — triggers a virtual dream of collectivity, which cements our digital alienation
and engenders social numbness, which in turn triggers the perverse process of mass
expropriation. We are facing an exhaustion of secrets to dream with; secrecy becomes
obsolete in a digital regime of transparency. It looks as though we know how to dream,
and yet we are unable to actually do it anymore. We no longer have secrets and have
become secrets ourselves.  This is  where (the inception of)  insomniac dream begins.
Diurnal insomnia helps us effectively move beyond what the digital (possibly) could be
to  what  it  virtually  will  have  been —  a  dreaming-machine.  Let  me  conclude  with  a
passage from Fernando Pessoa’s Book of Disquiet: 
I’ve dreamed a lot. I’m tired now from dreaming but not tired of dreaming. No one
tires of dreaming, because to dream is to forget, and forgetting does not weigh on
us; it is a dreamless sleep throughout which we remain awake (Pessoa 2010: 70).
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NOTES
1. For instance:  Jean Baudrillard (1993),  Mark Stefik (1997),  Slavoj  Žižek (1997),  Fred Botting
(2000),  Randal  Doane  (2006),  Paul  Virilio  (2012),  Jayne  I.  Gackenbach  (2009),  Stephen  Brock
Schafer (2016). 
2. This is a metaphor Marc Augé proposes to account for the “invasion of images” through which
“the  new  regime  of  the  imaginary  […]  nowadays  touches  social  life,  contaminating  it  and
penetrating  it  to  the  point  where  we mistrust  it,  its  reality,  its  meaning and the  categories
(identity, otherness) which shape and define it”. (1999: 2).
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3. ‘Draumr’ designates an imaginary event observed while sleeping, whereas its cognate ‘draugr’
stands for ghost, spirit, apparition. 
4. ‘Draugmaz’ literally expresses ‘to deceive’, ‘to injure’. 
5. ‘Drōm’ denotes joy, pleasure but also music and song. 
6. Interestingly enough, this latter rendering of dream prevailed in Old English, and the meaning
of ‘vision’ or ‘sleep’ took over the meaning of somniative activity. 
7. Interestingly, Freud indicates two mental processes that stimulate the emergence of dream —
first, unconscious processes formative of a wish expressed by the dream, and, second, prohibitive
processes that impede and pervert the expression of the wish. Thus, dreams are defined as a form
of wish-fulfillment. 
8. For instance, cyborgian, transhumanist, extropian, posthumanist, singulatarian.
9. In  Anti-Oedipus  (2004:  116)  Deleuze  and Guattari  write:  “Reading  text  is  never  a  scholarly
exercise in search of what is signified, still less a highly textual exercise in search of a signifier.
Rather it is a productive use of the literary machine, a montage of desiring-machines, a schizoid
exercise that extracts from the text its revolutionary force” 
10. Significantly, the collected volume Inception and Philosophy. Ideas to Die For, edited by Thorsten
Botz-Bornstein (2011), which offers an array of critical perspectives on the film, emphasizing its
cultural and philosophical importance, makes no reference to the digital. Neither does it address
the dream of insomnia, nor has recourse to Deleuze’s conceptual framework. This essay is partly
intended to fill this conspicuous gap. 
11. Many thinkers  pointed out  the  peculiar  proximity  and relation between technology  and
dream. Dreams were already considered a medium of the soul in ancient Rome. Marcel Mauss, in A
General Theory of  Magic,  states that dreaming “promotes and protects technology” (1972: 142).
Richard  Stivers,  analyzing  the  magical  characteristics  of  the  mass  media,  concludes  that  by
effectively fragmenting our elementary experience of time and space, dreams create “dreamlike
mood[s]” (2001: 112). In his most recent work, Mark B. N. Hansen writes, “When this data is fed-
forward into our embodied experience […],  it  marks and cannot but mark the intrusion of a
radical  exteriority  into  consciousness,  an  exteriority  that  cannot  so  much be  interiorized as
introjected” (2015: 220-222). Compounded by our sensible data, redesigned and profiled — both
individually  and  collectively  —  by  digital  machines,  sensory  experience  becomes  a  work  of
computational  dream  and,  by  implication,  our  cognition  becomes  increasingly  involuntary.
Technically, this bears a striking resemblance to the mechanics of dreams. 
12. A relevant case in point is provided by Frank Moss, former Director of the MIT Lab, in his
work The Sorcerers and Their Apprentices: How the Digital Magicians of the MIT Media Lab Are Creating
the Innovative Technologies That Will Transform Our Lives (2011), where he emphasizes the role of
dreams in the invention, innovation and distribution of digital apparatuses. 
13. I  refer  to  ‘rhapsody’  in  both  formal  (i.e.  social,  organizational)  and  psychological  (i.e.
experiential) sense. Building on two Greek terms ‘rhaptein’ (to stitch, sew) and ‘oide’ (ode, song),
rhapsody adequately renders the univocity of dream and the digital, emphasizing the entangled
and sprightly nature of their relation.
14. I mean ‘resonance’ in a Simondonian sense, i.e. as a mode of material intra-resonance among
disparate  forces  —  otherwise  coexisting  only  with  tension  —  that  establish  individuality
(Simondon 1989). 
15. See Nigel Thrift (2007), Éric Sadin (2011; 2015; 2016), Mark B. N. Hansen (2015). 
16. See Arnold Gehlen (1980). Importantly, this traditional, commonsensical, view of technology,
which  is  theoretically  supported  and  perpetuated  by  both  Plato’s  dualistic  metaphysics  and
Kant’s phenomenology, considerably differs from Heidegger’s innovative proposition to conceive
it not in terms of a means, but of a medium of experience, thus a mode of existence.
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17. In contradistinction to the dominant tradition of Vorstellung, Gestell points to the emergence
of phenomena. In Heidegger’s account, Gestell constitutes technology’s essence, which — far from
instrumentalism — denotes a mode of human existence (Ibid., 19-35). 
18. How far the digital extraction of secrets can go is demonstrated by recently published news
about  an AI  application built  by  Michał  Kosiński,  the  Stanford University  Professor,  and his
research collaborators,  that  can tell  our  sexual  orientation by computing a  handful  of  facial
photographs and our online traces. See Levin (2017).
19. The last sentence from the quotation reads in the original: “Si vous êtes pris dans le rêve de
I'autre, vous êtes foutu”, which emphasizes jeopardy and doom. 
20. Even though the digital and the virtual have two distinct yet simultaneously valid ontologies,
they contribute equally to our existence, albeit differently in terms of means and mediums. On
the  immanent  plane  of  forces,  they  remain  co-expressive  and  in  perpetual  struggle,  one
attempting to exhaust the possible of the other) and contribute equally to our existence, albeit
differently in terms of means and mediums. See also Evans (2010).
21. In-somnia expresses an active operation of dreaming oneself into the always already dreamed
reality. 
22. It can be argued that insomniac vigilance purges philosophy of the Kantian hangover of the
critical imperative, rediscovering the sense of thought — away from quest for wisdom — in an
exhausting love of  mystery.  In a text from 1987,  significantly titled “The Truth according to
Hermes: Theorems on the Secret and Communication”, François Laruelle, making a similar point,
conceptualizes a non-philosophical hermeneutics that places secret at the heart of thought. As
“the Uninterpretable”, the secret expresses the immanent truth (2010: 20) — it is not wisdom
that is sought or attempted, but mystery that animates the quest. Announcing the debacle of
philosophy,  Hermes  heralds  philomysterion,  a  love  of  mystery,  a  secretive  love  of  something
paradoxical, both the most remote from, and most proximate to, life itself — its sense. Going
beyond the phenomenal (representation) and the noumenal (truth) alike, vigilance consists in
indefatigable exploration of the mysterious insomniac realm of the virtual (simulacrum).
23. Yet,  admittedly,  digital  technologies have simultaneously placed the code at the heart of
dreams, so that this abstract, governing and alienating structure now occupies the place of the
Father.
24. ‘Inception’ etymologically derives from Latin and denotes commencement, initiating event.
25. Forgetting is an act that can be equally structural (unconsciously repeated) and intentional
(ideologically reiterated): thus, some ideas automatically — i.e. via cultural dreaming — cement
socially, thus becoming (apparently) eternal or transcendent. 
26. In L’Ange au secret (1991: 226) Cixous writes that dreams provide a return to “life before the
law” and “take us back to the cradle of humanity”; my translation.
27. I differ from the analysis of Inception delivered by Mark Fisher (2011: 37-45), where he reads
dream as  deceptive  and easy  to  manipulate.  He concludes,  “In  Inception,  as  in  late  capitalist
culture in general, you’re always in someone else’s dream, which is also the dream of no one”. 
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dream. Through an examination of  the aesthetic  and ontological  dimensions of  dreams,  this
article argues for a reading of digital cultural production in terms of diurnal insomnia. What can
a dreaming body do? Addressing that question, this essay will recast its insomniac capacities in
non-representational  terms.  Drawing  on  Gilles  Deleuze’s  philosophical  framework,  the  essay
disentangles  the  traditional  Western  conception  of  dreams  and  develops  an  alternative
proposition  of  a  dreaming-machine.  In  doing  so,  the  essay  will  make  references  to  the  film
Inception (dir. Christopher Nolan, 2010), which is read as an aesthetically adequate rendition of
the  insomniac  revolution  in  dreaming.  Probing  the  vigilancy  potential  of  insomnia  for  the
political  economy  of  contemporary  digital  culture,  the  essay  postulates  an  aesthetics  of
exhaustion. Far from an algorithmic lullaby, digital culture is recast as an aesthetic exercise in
insomniac exhaustion that allows us to experiment with alternative manners of dreaming (of)
ourselves, our worlds and lives beyond digital/digitized consciousness.
Nos  interactions  sensorielles  de  plus  en  plus  nombreuses  avec  les  médias  numériques,  leur
capacité à extraire des données sensibles de manière pré-cognitive et l’industrie de préformatage
de nos expériences nous donnent de plus en plus souvent le sentiment de vivre comme dans un
rêve. Après une analyse des dimensions esthétiques et ontologiques du rêve, nous reviendrons
sur la production culturelle numérique comme insomnie diurne. Que peut faire un corps qui
rêve ? Hantés par cette question et inspirés par les écrits de Gilles Deleuze, nous examinerons le
champ  de  l’insomnie  pour  nous  détacher  de  sa  représentation  occidentale  traditionnelle  et
travailler la proposition d’une machine à rêver. Inception (2010), le film de Christopher Nolan,
nous offre un exemple de ce que pourrait  être cette révolution insomniaque du rêve et  une
introduction à l’esthétique de l’épuisement à travers l’investigation du potentiel du thème de
l’insomnie dans l’économie politique de la  culture numérique contemporaine.  Loin d’être  un
somnifère  algorithmique  et  par-delà  ce  dont  nous  avons  conscience  en  ligne,  la  culture
numérique  devient  le  lieu  d’un  exercice  esthétique  de  l’insomnie  qui  nous  permet
d’expérimenter de nouvelles manières de rêver nos mondes, nos vies et nous-mêmes.
INDEX
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